KANT'S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AND THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW A PHILOSOPHICAL REASSESSMENT

Abstract

The compatibility of judicial review with democratic governance remains one of the most contentious issues in contemporary political and legal philosophy. While judicial review is often defended as a mechanism for protecting constitutional rights and limiting governmental excesses, critics argue that it grants unelected judges excessive authority over decisions that ought to be determined by the people and their elected representatives. This paper examines the democratic legitimacy of judicial review through the lens of Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative. Drawing primarily on Kant's conception of justice, freedom, and universal law, the study argues that democratic institutions derive their legitimacy from moral principles rooted in rationality, equality, and accountability. The paper contends that the categorical imperative provides an ethical foundation for democratic governance because it requires individuals and institutions to act according to principles capable of universal application. Employing a conceptual and critical philosophical methodology, the study evaluates the relationship between democracy and judicial review and assesses whether judicial institutions, particularly in Africa, operate consistently with democratic values. It argues that judicial review becomes democratically legitimate only when judicial authority is exercised in accordance with universal principles of justice, accountability, and public responsibility. The paper concludes that strengthening judicial accountability and ethical leadership, while preserving judicial independence, offers a viable pathway for reconciling judicial review with democratic governance in contemporary African states.